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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jeffrey Dane Murray appeals from the district court's order dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Murray pled guilty to one count of felony
domestic violence 1 and the state agreed to limit its sentencing recommendation
to a suspended sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, and to allow Murray
to argue for a lesser sentence.

(See R., p.3; see generally Exhibit 2.)

The

agreement also required Murray to get a domestic violence and alcohol
evaluation.

(Exhibit 2, p.?, Ls.?-8.) After the parties placed the terms of the

agreement on the record, the following discussion occurred:
THE COURT: Okay, is there an Estrada[2J waiver?
[PROSECUTOR]: I believe so.
THE COURT: Well, I think there would have to be. I'm not going to
take it without an Estrada waiver.
[DEFE;NSE COUNSEL]:
prosecutor.

Just a moment, let me talk to the

(Brief delay.)

1 The state originally charged Murray with attempted strangulation, which carries
a maximum penalty of 15 years, I.C. § 18-923, and misdemeanor battery. (R.,
p.94.) The plea agreement allowed Murray to plead guilty to a single amended
charge of felony domestic violence, which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years
for a first offense, I.C. § 18-918. (R., p.94.)

2 Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006).
1

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:
Honor.

Yes, that's fine.

He will waive, Your

THE COURT: Is that

you want to do, Mr. Murray?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: Is there anything else you are expecting I didn't hear
about?
THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am.
THE COURT: Okay. And so you do want to plead guilty under
these terms today?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, ma'am.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
(Exhibit 2, p.?, L.25 - p.8, L.20.)
The court also later inquired, during Murray's plea colloquy, whether
Murray understood he was "giving up [his] rights under State versus Estrada,"
which meant that he could not "refuse to answer any question or provide any
information that might tend to show [he committed] some other crime," and that
he would need to "talk freely and openly with the presentence investigator and
with any domestic violence evaluator about any problems that [he] might have
that might have a bearing upon sentencing." (Exhibit 2, p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.6.)
Murray responded, "Yes, ma'am," and reiterated that response when the court
affirmed whether he was "aware of that." (Exhibit 2, p.17, Ls.7-9. 3 )

Paragraph 2 of the guilty plea questionnaire, which Murray initialed prior to
entering his guilty plea, also addressed the nature of an Estrada waiver. (Exhibit
1.) Paragraph 2 reads:
3

The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of
guilty to the crime(s) in this case unless you are waiving your rights

2

Consistent with the terms of the plea agreement, the court ordered Murray
to obtain a domestic violence evaluation and an alcohol evaluation. (Tr., p.21,
Ls.10-22.) The domestic violence evaluator completed an evaluation, which was
submitted to the court.

(Exhibit 3.)

Based on the information provided to the

court at sentencing, including the domestic violence evaluation, the court
imposed a unified ten-year sentence with three years fixed, but declined to follow
the state's recommendation to suspend the sentence in lieu of 120 days in jail.
(Exhibit 2, pp.31-37.)
Although Murray reserved his right to appeal his sentence, he did not do
so. (R., ppA, 33; Exhibit 2, p.17, L.24 - p.18, L.10.) Murray did, however, file a
Rule 35 motion and filed a notice of appeal timely only from the denial of that
motion. (See R., pA.) The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Rule 35 relief
on the ground that Murray failed to support his motion with new or additional
information not considered at the time of sentencing.

State v. Murray, Docket

No. 37482, 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 693 (Idaho App. Nov. 1, 2010).

Course Of Post-Conviction Proceedings
While is Rule 35 appeal was pending, Murray, through counsel, filed a
petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.3-12.) In his petition, Murray alleged (1)

under State v. Estrada.
Unless you waive your rights under
Estrada, even after pleading guilty, you will still have the right to
refuse to answer any question or to provide any information that
might tend to show you committed some other crime(s). You can
also refuse to answer or provide any information that might tend to
increase the punishment for the crime(s) to which you are pleading
guilty.
(Exhibit 1, p.1.)

3

his guilty plea was invalid because he was "not aware at the time [he] entered the
guilty plea that the Court did not have to follow the terms of the plea agreement"
even though he signed a guilty plea questionnaire advising him of such (R., pp.45); (2) ineffective assistance of counsel at the change of plea hearing based on
counsel's failure to explain to Murray what it meant to waive his rights under
Estrada and counsel's failure to obtain a "confidential domestic violence
evaluation prior to entering a plea of guilty" (R., pp.6-7); (3) ineffective assistance
of counsel at sentencing for failing to discuss the domestic violence evaluation
with Murray prior to sentencing or "take any actions to try to correct those factual
misunderstandings in the court-ordered evaluations," and for failing to seek a
continuance of the sentencing to allow more time to discuss the presentence
investigation ("PSI") and attempt to "disprove" "false statements" contained in the
PSI (R., pp.6-9); (4) ineffective assistance of counsel "post-sentencing" for failing
to advise Murray of his ability to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and a
notice of appeal 4 (R., pp.9-10); and (5) ineffective assistance of counsel for
failing to advise Murray that he "could obtain another evaluation in order to rebut
the findings in the court-ordered evaluation and support [his] Rule 35 motion" (R.,
pp.10-11).
Murray's post-conviction case ultimately proceeded to an evidentiary
hearing after which the district court issued a Decision denying Murray's request

4 This ineffective assistance of counsel claim was alleged against two attorneys the attorney that represented Murray through sentencing and a different attorney
who appeared as Murray's counsel "nine days after the judgment and sentence
was filed." (R., pp.9-11.) The only claims raised on appeal relate to Murray's
original trial counsel who represented him through sentencing.

4

for post-conviction relief.

(See generally Tr.; R., pp.93-112.)

timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.114-117.)

5

Murray filed a

ISSUE
Murray states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Murray's petition for
post-conviction relief?
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Murray failed to show error in the district court's denial of his postconviction petition?

6

ARGUMENT
Murray Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying Relief On His
Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective In Advising Him Of His Rights In Relation To
The Domestic Violence Evaluation
A.

Introduction
Murray contends the district court erred in denying relief on his claim that

counsel was ineffective "for failing to discuss with him his rights under Estrada v.
State, 143 Idaho 558 (2006), and advise him as to whether he should waive
those rights before he entered a plea of guilty and participated in a court-ordered
domestic evaluation." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Murray further asserts error in the
denial of relief on his related claim that counsel was ineffective "for failing to
advise him that he could obtain a confidential domestic violence evaluation prior
to pleading guilty." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) A review of the evidence presented
at the post-conviction hearing and the applicable legal standards supports the
district court's conclusion that Murray is not entitled to relief on these claims.

B.

Standard Of Review
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents mixed questions of

law and fact. A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by
a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which her claim is based.
Idaho Criminal Rule 57(c); Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430,436,725 P.2d 135, 141
(1986). A trial court's decision that the petitioner has not met his burden of proof
is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964,
965 (Ct. App. 1990). Further, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be

7

given to the testimony are matters within the discretion of the trial court. Rueth v.
State, 103 Idaho 74,644 P.2d 1333 (1982).

C.

Murray Has Failed To Establish He Met His Burden Of Proving Counsel
Was Ineffective In Relation To His Advice Regarding Murray's "Estrada
Rights" And His Ability To Obtain A Confidential Evaluation
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-

conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting
prejudice.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v.

Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,137,774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989).

An attorney's

performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson
v. State, 110 Idaho 631,634,718 P.2d 283,286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116
Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To establish prejudice, a
defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Aragon
v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761,760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowgerv. State, 132
Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). The United States Supreme
Court has recently reiterated:
Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task. An
ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules
of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and
so the Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care,
lest intrusive post-trial inquiry threaten the integrity of the very
adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve.

8

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (citations and quotations
omitted).
Murray contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel in relation
to the court-ordered domestic violence evaluation.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-17.)

The district court correctly concluded Murray is not entitled to relief on this claim.
In Estrada, the defendant participated in a court-ordered psychosexual
evaluation after pleading guilty to rape.

143 Idaho at 560, 149 P.3d at 835.

Estrada's attorney advised him that he needed to fully cooperate in the
evaluation.

&

The evaluation of Estrada was ultimately unfavorable and was

relied on by the district court in imposing a life sentence with 25 years fixed.

&

Estrada subsequently filed a post-conviction petition contending his attorney was
deficient for failing to advise him that he was not required to participate in the
evaluation and that he was prejudiced as a result because, without the
evaluation, he would have received a more favorable sentence.
court denied relief and Estrada appealed.

&

&

The district

at 561, 149 P.3d at 836.

On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held Estrada's attorney was deficient
in "failing to inform Estrada of his right to assert the privilege against selfincrimination," which right it found applied to the psychosexual evaluation.
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 564, 149 P.3d at 839. The Court also held Estrada met his
burden of demonstrating prejudice because the "sentencing judge's specific,
repeated references to the psychosexual evaluation suggest that it did play an
important role in the sentencing."

&

at 565, 149 P.3d at 840.

9

Relying on Estrada, Murray alleged in his post-conviction petition that his
attorney was deficient for failing to advise him what it meant to waive his rights
under Estrada. (R., p.6.) Although trial counsel testified that he "[p]robably didn't
fully explain [the Estrada] rights in detail" (Tr., p.11 0, Ls.12-19), and he "may not
have" explained to Murray that he was waiving his right against self-incrimination
(Tr., p.111, Ls.1-7), the district court ultimately concluded this deficiency did not
entitle Murray to relief because the court itself advised Murray of the nature of the
rights he was waiving under Estrada (R., p.107). Specifically, the court cited the
Estrada language from the guilty plea questionnaire, which Murray initialed. (R.,
p.107.)

The court also discussed the waiver with Murray during his plea

colloquy. (Exhibit 2, p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.6.) As noted by the district court, under
Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 254 P.3d 69 (Ct. App. 2011), the information it
provided to Murray regarding his waiver satisfied the requirements of Estrada.
(R., p.1 07.)
Murray acknowledges Gonzales "[u]nquestionably . . . stands for the
principle cited by the district court."

(Appellant's Brief, p.10.)

Nevertheless,

Murray "maintains that Gonzales was incorrectly decided by the Idaho Court of
Appeals, especially in light of the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in

Estrada and State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1998)."

(Appellant's Brief, p.10.)

Murray also argues his "case can be distinguished from those [sic] in Gonzales."
(Appellant's Brief, p.1 0.) Murray's arguments fail.
Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedent. The rule of
stare decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed "unless it is

10

manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy
continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002);
State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting
Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990));
see also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992)
("[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly wrong
or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise."); State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho
384, 388, 871 P.2d 801, 805 (1994) ("Having previously decided this question,
and being presented with no new basis upon which to consider the issue, [the
Court is] guided by the principle of stare decisis to adhere to the law as
expressed in [its] earlier opinions."); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 440-52, 825
P.2d 1081, 1096-1108 (1991) (McDevitt, J., specially concurring).

Murray has

failed to meet his burden of showing Gonzales should be overruled.
Murray contends Gonzales was wrongly decided because the Court in that
case failed to recognize that defense counsel must provide advice regarding
whether to assert the right not to participate in the evaluation. (Appellant's Brief,
p.12.) According to Murray,
To hold that a district court's statements concerning a
defendant's Estrada rights are the functional equivalent of an
attorney's advice on the subject, as the Court of Appeals did in
Gonzales and the district court did in this case, makes too little of
the requirement that defense counsel 'advise' a defendant with
respect to whether to submit to a potentially-incriminating
evaluation.
(Appellant's Brief, p.12.)

11

Murray's argument ignores the crux of his own claim.

In his petition,

Murray asserted that he was never advised "what rights [he] had under 'State v.

Estrada.'" (R., p.6.) His argument on appeal and his complaint about Gonzales,
however, focuses on counsel's role in advising whether to participate in such an
evaluation. As to whether Murray was adequately advised of what his Estrada
rights were, the Court in Gonzales was precisely right: "While it is preferable for
counsel to advise a defendant of his right to remain silent and to discuss the
consequences of submitting to the evaluation, counsel may not be deficient for
failing to readvise the defendant once the sentencing court has done so."
Gonzales, 151 Idaho at 173, 254 P.3d at 74.
Murray's

claim

that

Gonzales

is

not

applicable

because

it

is

"distinguishable" also lacks merit. (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Murray argues:
Unlike the facts of Gonzales, here the district court provided
conflicting statements concerning Mr. Murray's Estrada rights,
specifically stating in the guilty plea questionnaire that, by pleading
guilty, Mr. Murray was retaining his Estrada rights (Plaintiff's
Exghibit 1, p.1), while at the plea colloquy, stating,
And you understand you are giving up your rights
under State versus Estrada [sic], and that means that
you cannot refuse to answer any question or provide
any information that might tend to show you
committed some other crime?
You need to talk freely and openly with the
presentence investigator and with any domestic
violence evaluator about any problems that you might
have that might have a bearing upon sentencing.
(Appellant's Brief, p.13 (emphasis original) (quoting Exhibit 2, p.16, L.22 - p.17,
L.6).)

12

This argument is unsupported by the record. The questionnaire advised
Murray his waiver of the right to remain silent only applied to his guilty plea
"unless" he was waiving his rights under Estrada. (Exhibit 1, p.1.) Because it
was clear the court required an Estrada waiver given the terms of the plea
agreement (Exhibit 2, p.7, L.25 -

p.S, L.10), which Murray knew before

completing the questionnaire and engaging in his plea colloquy (Exhibit 2, p.9,
L.11 - p.21, L.4), his claim that Gonzales does not apply because he was
"provided conflicting statements concerning [his] Estrada rights" is meritless.
Murray further asserts, "Aside from the fact that the two pieces of
information provided by the district court contradict each other, the latter
statement was incorrect." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Murray's contention that "the
latter statement was incorrect" is premised upon the assertion that he could have
"reasserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination at any time
prior to, or during, the evaluation" in violation of the plea agreement. (Appellant's
Brief, p.13.) Murray's acknowledgement that he could have breached the plea
agreement by failing to comply with one of its terms does not make the court's
statements about the meaning of his waiver incorrect. Moreover, Murray cites no
authority for the proposition that a proper advisement regarding a Fifth
Amendment waiver, particularly in the context of a negotiated plea agreement,
must include advice on the practical ability to ignore the waiver and breach the
agreement.
To the extent Murray is also claiming counsel's advice to cooperate in the
evaluation was deficient, his claim fails. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) The state's offer

13

was predicated, in part, on Murray's participation in and cooperation with the
evaluation.

(Exhibit 2, p.7, Ls.7-S.)

That the evaluation was ultimately

unfavorable to Murray does not mean the advice to participate in the evaluation
in order to take advantage of the plea offer was deficient.
Nor was Murray's trial counsel deficient in failing to obtain a confidential
evaluation prior to advising Murray whether to plead guilty pursuant to the state's
plea offer.

In denying relief on this claim, the district court again relied on

Gonzales. (R., p.10S.) Like Murray, Gonzales, relying on State v. Wood, 132
Idaho SS, 967 P.2d 702 (199S), asserted his attorney was ineffective "because,
without first obtaining a confidential evaluation, trial counsel could not have made
an informed decision about whether to advise . . . against participating in the
court-ordered evaluation."

Gonzales, 151 Idaho at 173, 254 P.3d at 74.

rejecting this claim, the Court of Appeals reasoned:
In Wood, the Idaho Supreme Court held that trial counsel
was deficient for failing to object to the inclusion of, as part of the
presentence report, a psychological evaluation prepared by a
doctor appointed to assist in Wood's defense. Wood, 132 Idaho at
97,101,967 P.2d at 711,715. The Court further held that trial
counsel's failure to object to the doctor's testimony at sentencing
Id. at 101, 967 P.2d at 715.
Wood is
was unreasonable.
distinguishable from this case because the psychological evaluation
in Wood had already taken place, but the report had not yet been
written at the time of the doctor's testimony. The Court in Wood
held that trial counsel should have objected to the doctor's
testimony and the inclusion of the evaluation as part of the
presentence report because trial counsel was not aware of the
evaluation's possibly damaging contents. Id. Here, the issue is not
the inclusion of a possibly damaging defense evaluation. Rather,
the issue is whether counsel was deficient for failing to initiate an
independent evaluation in the first place. As the Idaho Supreme
Court held in Wood, once such an evaluation is conducted, trial
counsel should be informed as to the evaluation's contents and
object to its inclusion at sentencing should it possibly contain
14

In

incriminating information. Id. However, Wood does not stand for
the proposition that trial counsel is ineffective for failing to arrange
an independent evaluation which may reveal incriminating evidence
prior to a court-ordered evaluation.
Gonzales, 151 Idaho at 174, 254 P.3d at 75.
The Court of Appeals further held "the obligation of counsel, recognized in

Estrada, to advise the defendant regarding a court-ordered psychosexual
evaluation does not extend to an obligation to first obtain a confidential defense
evaluation to inform the decision whether to submit to a court-ordered
evaluation."

Gonzales, 151 Idaho at 174, 254 P.3d at 75.

Thus, "Counsel's

failure to arrange a defense evaluation in order to prepare for the possible
incriminating outcome of a subsequent evaluation does not constitute deficient
performance."

19.: Murray argues this aspect of Gonzales is not controlling

because, he asserts, he has "put forth a different argument, namely that his
attorney was ineffective for failing to advise him of his right to obtain a
confidential domestic violence evaluation prior to pleading guilty." (Appellant's
Brief, p.16 (emphasis original).) This is not a meaningful distinction because,
under either scenario, the question is the same - whether counsel is deficient for
failing to obtain an independent evaluation before advising his client on whether
to participate in a court-ordered evaluation.

Further, Murray's attempt to

distinguish Gonzales by differentiating between counsel's advice in relation to his
guilty plea and his advice in relation to sentencing evaluations highlights that the
heart of his argument is not an Estrada violation but a claim arising under Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985), and its progeny, which Murray does not cite.
Application of the Hill standard shows no error.
15

"This Court applies the Strickland test when determining whether a
defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea
process."

Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617, 262 P.3d 255, 260 (2011)

(citations omitted).

"When a defendant alleges some deficiency in counsel's

advice regarding a guilty plea, the defendant must demonstrate that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to triaL"
(quotations and citations omitted).

hi. at 621, 262 P.3d at 264

"Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of

claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea
bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky,
130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)).
Murray cites no authority for the proposition that counsel is deficient in
advising a client to accept a plea offer that requires participation in a courtordered evaluation without first obtaining an independent evaluation, and in fact,
Gonzales supports a contrary conclusion.

A guilty plea is valid if entered

knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently, meaning the defendant has entered his
plea understanding the rights he is waiving and the consequences of pleading
guilty.

State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 484, 861 P.25 51, 54 (1993).

Murray

entered his guilty plea being fully advised of these rights and after being advised
of, and agreeing to waive, his rights in relation to the court-ordered sentencing
evaluations.

(See generally Exhibit 2.) That the domestic violence evaluation

ultimately cast Murray in an unfavorable light did not render his guilty plea invalid
nor did it render counsel's advice in relation to that plea deficient.

16

Murray's

assertion that had counsel advised him of his "right" to obtain a confidential
evaluation prior to accepting the plea offer, he would have done so and he
"would not have pled guilty and submitted to a court-ordered evaluation had he
known that waiving his Estrada rights could have resulted in a greater sentence"
(Appellant's Brief, p.16), not only muddles the relevant legal standard, it fails to
satisfy it.
As noted, Murray has the burden of showing it would have been rational
under the circumstances to reject the plea offer. There is no evidence that the
plea offer allowed Murray to obtain his own private evaluation first or at all.
Rather, the offer required Murray to participate in a court-ordered evaluation that
would be available to the court at sentencing. Absent the evaluation, there was
no plea offer for Murray to accept or reject.

Thus, it is ultimately irrelevant

whether Murray could or would have obtained his own evaluation prior to
entering his guilty plea. In other words, Murray's claim that he would not have
pled guilty "had he known ahead of time that his evaluation would be so
unfavorable" (Appellant's Brief, p.17), assumes a factual predicate that does not
exist, i.e., that the plea offer was available to him regardless of his participation
in the court-ordered evaluation. In addition to this flaw in Murray's argument, he
has provided no convincing reason why he would have rejected the plea offer
and proceeded to trial on additional charges, one of which carries a greater
penalty (compare I.C. § 18-923 with I.C. § 18-918), and without the benefit of a
limited sentencing recommendation from the state.

Indeed, his claim that he

would have proceeded to trial and faced a greater penalty rather than plead guilty
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and participate in an evaluation that contributed to a "greater sentence" than the
one he was hoping for (albeit still consistent with the state's underlying
sentencing recommendation) seems disingenuous.
A review of the applicable law, the record on appeal, and the underlying
criminal record, supports the district court's conclusion that Murray failed to meet
his burden of proving he us entitled to post-conviction relief.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order denying Murray's petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 6th day of November, 2012.
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